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PRIVACY IN WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
Make way for the information superhighway! You will need your
mobile telephone, wireless e-mail, and other wireless communication
devices to travel on the technological fast lane. "Wireless communica-
tion" no longer means shouting into a crackling walkie-talkie. Today's
"wireless communication" includes such sophisticated devices as cor-
dless telephones, cellular telephones, pocket pagers, and personal
communicators. These devices give the user mobility by allowing the
user to send or receive messages from anywhere.
With a society as mobile as ours, is it any wonder that wireless
communication devices have become so popular? In 1990 cordless
telephones could be found in one out of every four households,1 and
an additional eleven million units were sold in the same year. 2 Ap-
proximately twelve million people in the United States own cellular
telephones.' The popularity of wireless communication devices is in-
creasing as technological innovations are making them more afforda-
ble.4 "By the end of the decade, analysts project more than 25% of
the United States population will want some type of wireless tele-
phone service."5
Instead of using wires, wireless communication devices communi-
cate over radio waves. Some wireless communication devices use mi-
crowaves or infrared waves, which are simply radio waves of a
different frequency.6 Basically, a message goes over telephone lines to
a message switch which "packages" the signal for transmission and
moves the message to an "uplink packet assembler/dissembler"
(PAD).7 The PAD transmits the signal up to a satellite, which sends
the message to base stations on earth.' The base stations can broad-
cast the message to ninety percent of the United States, so one does
1. Robert A. Crook, Sorry, Wrong Number, The Effect of Telephone Technology on
Privacy Rights, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669, 679 & n.140 (1991).
2. Id. at 679 & n.141.
3. John J. Keller & Gautam Naik, New Wireless Phone Networks Take First Step To-
ward Reality, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1993, at B1.
4. Crook, supra note 1, at 679, 687.
5. Id.
6. Microwave transmissions are high frequency radio waves that transmit from point-
to-point on line-of-sight paths between terrestrial antennas, usually via satellite. Robert
W. Kastenmeier et. al., Communications Privacy: A Legislative Perspective, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 715, 722.
7. Angela Gunn, Wireless Communications: Connecting Over the Airwaves, PC
MAO., Aug. 1993, at 359, 361.
8. Id.
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not need to know the location of the recipient when sending a
message. 9
Although this process leaves communications vulnerable to inter-
ception, Title III of the Omnibus Safe Street and Crime Act of 196810
protects wireless communications as "aural acquisitions."" In cellular
transmissions, voice signals are converted into FM radio waves, which
are then beamed to local base stations clustered in cells. The radio
waves are transmitted to and from switching stations within each cell.
Calls are relayed between cells, constantly switching frequencies as
users move from cell to cell.' 2
As the Clinton Administration proudly heralds the technology of
the twenty-first century, it grapples with a growing problem of this
decade: privacy in wireless communications. Since wireless communi-
cations use the airwaves, the communications are susceptible to inter-
ception. For instance, an ordinary AM/FM radio can intercept
cordless telephone conversations. This Note will discuss possible solu-
tions to this privacy problem. Two solutions proposed by the Clinton
Administration are 1) the Clipper Chip, an inexpensive encryption de-
vice, which will still allow law enforcement' to tap into communica-
tions, and 2) proposed legislation that bans technology that the
government cannot decode. Other proposed solutions to the privacy
issue consider law enforcement's need to be able to enforce court-
ordered wiretaps. Among these solutions, holding manufacturers




The greatest feature of wireless communications is the ability to
send and receive messages from anywhere. However, this feature
makes these devices susceptible to unauthorized interceptions by
eavesdroppers and law enforcement officers. Cordless telephone con-
versations are vulnerable to being overheard not only by neighbors
with cordless telephones but also by neighbors with normal AM/FM
9. Id.
10. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1988).
12. Digitized cellular telephone communications are transmitted via wire to the tele-
phone company switching office. The communications are then transmitted to a mobilized
telephone switching office where the transmission is reformatted to cellular frequency for-
mat. Finally, the transmission is moved to the cell site for broadcast to base stations. The
base stations broadcast the transmission.to the receiver. Gunn, supra note 7, at 376.
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radios. Similarly, cellular telephones are vulnerable to certain scan-
ners.13 When using a cordless or cellular telephone, the user's privacy
could be violated without his or her knowledge.
It is not difficult to intercept wireless communications. A cor-
dless telephone consists of a handset and a base unit. AM or FM ra-
dio signals transmit the communication from the handset to the base
unit. From the base unit, the communication is transmitted over wire,
just like a regular telephone call. The radio portions of those tele-
phone calls (the portion transmitted from the handset to the base
unit) can be intercepted with relative ease using a standard AM
radio.
14
To intercept cellular telephone calls all the eavesdropper needs is
a radio capable of picking up those wavelengths. "And since most
long-distance telephone calls are transmitted by microwave nowadays,
they're not hard to listen to, either. Zeroing in on a particular tele-
phone is harder but not impossible."' 5 Televisions, VCRs, and scan-
ners can easily intercept cellular communications.' 6
Interception is not only theoretically easy, it happens frequently.
Just ask England's Prince Charles and Princess Diana.'7 There are
countless other examples of eavesdropping on wireless communica-
tions. In 1984 shortwave radio operators intercepted President Rea-
13. A scanner is an electronic device that pinpoints and is able to intercept communi-
cations transversing along a specific band of frequency. Fred J. Meyer, Note, Don't Touch
that Dial: Radio Listening Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 416, 424 & n.61 (1988).
14. Linda S. Robinson, Wrong Number: Disconnecting the Cordless Telephone from
the Right to Privacy, 13 CRIM. JUST. J. 101, 106 (1991). See also State v. Delaurier, 488
A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985); State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984); John R. Kresse, Privacy
of Conversations Over Cordless and Cellular Telephones: Federal Protection Under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 9 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 335, 338-39
(1987).
. 15. David Kahn, Scrambling for Privacy While Devices Are Being Developed that
Could Lock Out Eavesdroppers, The Government Is Seeking a Set of Keys for Law-En-
forcement Agencies, NEWSDAY, July 21, 1993, at 50.
16. Timothy R. Rabel, Comment, The Electronic Communications and Privacy Act:
Discriminatory Treatment for Similar Technology, Cutting the Cord of Privacy, 23 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 661, 674 & n.94 (1990). Interception of a conversation on a conventional
telephone line is also easy. "It takes no more than a pair of alligator clips and a handset
because the signal has not been converted or broken up and is moving along a single wire."
Robert L. Hotz, Change in Technology May Curtail Wiretaps; Surveillance: Agents Will
Have Difficulty Isolating the One Conversation They Are Authorized to Intercept, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at A31.
17. Prince Charles' cellular telephone conversations with Camilla Parker Bowles were
taped and published. Similarly, tapes were also made of Princess Diana's telephone con-
versations with a male friend who was using a mobile telephone. How Three Private Phone
Calls Went Public, DAILY MAIL, May 13, 1993, at 11.
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gan's secret communications aboard Air Force One. 8 In 1988
political rivals of Virginia Governor Wilder monitored his telephone
conversations. 19 In June 1993 hackers intercepted telephone conver-
sations between Secretary of State Warren Christopher's aides about
United States missile attacks on Baghdad.2 °
These types of interception can be very harmful. The ability to
intercept wireless communications undermines the wireless user's
ability to communicate in confidence. It should not matter whether
the communications relate to business data, legal strategy, or personal
secrets.
The confidentiality of an individual's communications is a basic
right of our society. Eavesdropping was condemned as a nuisance
even at common law, and the fourth amendment was included in
the Bill of Rights to protect individuals against intrusions into their
privacy. However, this right to privacy often conflicts with the gov-
ernment's interest in law enforcement and intelligence. 2'
As President Clinton noted recently, one of the government's pri-
mary responsibilities is to protect the public by enforcing the law.22
Law enforcement officers sometimes eavesdrop pursuant to a court
order in the name of protecting the public, but the ease of intercepting
wireless communications may tempt the police to eavesdrop without a
court order. For example, in United States v. Hall23 a woman listening
to her radio overheard suspicious conversations between two mobile
car telephone users. After listening for a month, she informed the
police. The police continued to listen for five weeks without obtaining
a court order. The evidence collected led to the convictions of three
individuals for drug trafficking.24 In State v. Delaurier25 a boy playing
with his AM radio tuned into a frequency which allowed him and his
mother to overhear the cordless telephone conversations of their
neighbor, Delaurier. The mother called the police reporting that she
had overheard a conversation regarding the sale of drugs. The police
moved the radio to a nearby location and recorded conversations over
several weeks-without a search warrant. These conversations led to
18. Steven M. Richman, Voices that Go Bump in the Night: Conflicting Rights Under
the Wiretap Statutes, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 171, 171 & n.1 (1987).
19. John Eckhouse, New Phones Keep Trade Secrets Safe Encryption Devices Thwart
Eavesdroppers, S.F. CHRON., July 9, 1993, at El.
20. Id.
21. Lisa A. Wintersheimer, Privacy Versus Law Enforcement-Can the Two Be Recon-
ciled?, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 315 (1988) (citations ommitted).
22. Proclamation No. 6679, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,955 (1994).
23. 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973).
24. Id.
25. 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985).
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arrests of Delaurier and others for drug sales, gambling, and prostitu-
tion. The police recordings were not excluded from evidence.26
Since Hall and Delaurier the police have encouraged neighbors
who have accidently overheard crime-related conversations to moni-
tor and tape what they overhear.27 In Tyler v. Berodt28 the Berodts'
cordless telephone picked up conversations of their neighbor Tyler,
who lived over four blocks away. The Berodts' overheard conversa-
tions regarding illegal activity and notified the police. The police en-
couraged the Berodts to continue to monitor the calls and tape record
the conversations, all without a court order.29
II
The Current Patchwork of Solutions
The problem of unwarranted electronic surveillance by law en-
forcement officers and interception of communications by others did
not arise with the advent of wireless communications. Even before
wireless communications were invented, a patchwork of remedies or
solutions addressed this problem: legislation30 (including Title III of
the Omnibus Safe Street and Crime Act of 1968 and the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act of 1986), warning labels stating that the
communications can be intercepted,31  and devices scrambling
communications .32
26. Id. at 694. See also Donald Battaglia, State v. Delaurier: Privacy Rights and Cor-
dless Telephones-The Fourth Amendment Is Put on Hold, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1087,
1089-90 (1986).
27. H. W. William Caming, The Whole World is Listening: A Quirk in Technology
Makes It Unrealistic to Expect Privacy if Your Phone is Cordless, 5 CRIM. JUST. 28, 29
(1991).
28. 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990).
29. Tyler, 877 F.2d at 706. The recorded conversations were suppressed at trial. Tyler
then sued Berodt in a civil suit. The court granted Berodt's motion for summary judgment,
finding no cause of action. Id. Robinson, supra note 14, at 101. See also Caming, supra
note 27, at 29.
30. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
31. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 15.236 (1984); S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3562.
32. See, e.g., Jaleen Nelson, Comment, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital
Wiretap Bill and its Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1139, 1173 (1994); Samuel Rosenstein, Note, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 and Satellite Descramblers: Toward Preventing Statutory Obsolescence, 76 MINN. L.




The cellular industry successfully pushed for a federal law making
it illegal to pass on overheard conversations.33 Unfortunately, the
availability of technology and free access to radio signals have ren-
dered the law toothless.34 In essence, "[i]t's illegal to listento a cellu-
lar-phone conversation, and it's about to be illegal to make or sell
scanners that can tap cellular frequencies. People will do it anyway,
and there's no law stopping your neighbor from listening to calls you
make on your cordless phone."35
Congress further attempted to deal with the issue of protecting
the privacy of wire and oral communications with the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA). 36 The purpose of the ECPA
was to provide a uniform basis for the conditions and circumstances
under which the interception of wire and oral communications would
be permitted.37
Prior to the ECPA, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safety Street Act of 1968 had regulated the manufacture, possession,
and advertisement of electronic surveillance equipment.38 Title III
provided for a $10,000 fine and up to five years imprisonment for vio-
lation of its regulations. 39 For authorization to use a wiretap under
this Act, law enforcement officers were required to state the facts in
writing justifying a court order as well as to state the length of time
the wiretap was to be maintained.40
In 1986 Congress enacted the ECPA to provide a civil remedy to
"any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is inter-
33. Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 generally prohibited the intercep-
tion, divulgence, and misuse of both wire and radio communications. 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1988). Section 605 provided, in pertinent part, that
[n]o person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting,- or assisting in
transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall di-
vulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning
thereof .... No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiv-
ing any interstate or foreign communication by radio.
Id.
34. New Device Will Make Calls Private, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 17, 1993, at IF. See also
Rabel, supra note 16, at 672-73.
35. Dan Gillmor, Feds' Phone Call Scrambler Lets Them Listen, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, May 6, 1993, at 1F.
36. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C.) (amending Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safety Street
Act of 1968, supra note 10).
37. Id. (Findings).
38. Wintersheimer, supra note 21, at 322-23.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
40. Id. § 2516.
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cepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation" of the Act's pro-
visions," with an exception, subject to judicial scrutiny, for law
enforcement agencies if the interception is in connection with an in-
vestigation of certain offenses conducted pursuant to a court order.42
The ECPA expanded the list of crimes in which electronic surveillance
may be utilized, providing for differing penalties depending on intent
and use of the interception. 43 The ECPA prohibits intentional inter-
ception of certain radio communications, including cellular mobile tel-
ephone and paging system transmissions." Consequently,
unintentional eavesdroppers of a protected communication may re-
port what they hear to law enforcement.45
In general, the ECPA protects two types of communications
against warrantless electronic surveillance: "wire communications"
and "oral communications. ' 46 "Wire communications" are defined as
communications transmitted by aid of a wire between the point of ori-
gin and the point of reception. 47 The term "wire communications" has
been interpreted in United States v. Hall as any communication which
is aided by wire at any point.48  To be a "wire" communication the
41. Id. § 2520(a).
42. Id. § 2516. See also Russell S. Burnside, The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986: The Challenge of Applying Ambiguous Statutory Language to Intricate Tele-
communication Technologies, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451, 504 (1987). The
requirements for a court order wiretap differs for electronically transmitted data than for
voice communications-they can be based upon violation of any federal felony, rather than
the limited list of crimes for voice communications. Kastenmeier et al., supra note 6, at
727-28. "Congress sought to ensure privacy of communications transmitted by wire and
those made orally by criminalizing their interception and by conferring upon aggrieved
parties a civil right of action against individuals who intercept protected communications."
Samuel Rosenstein, The Electronic Communications and Privacy Act of 1986 and Satellite
Descramblers: Toward Preventing Statutory Obsolescence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1456
nn.24-25 (1992).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4). Generally, prohibited interceptions are punishable as a fel-
ony with penalties of a fine or five years in prison, or both. Id. § 2511(4)(a). For a first
time offense (if not tortious, illegal, or for commercial gain), the penalty is less than one
year prison or a fine, or both. Id. § 2511(4)(b). As noted above, offenders are also poten-
tially subject to civil actions by those whose communications have been intercepted. Id.
§ 2520.
44. Id. § 2511(4)(b).
45. However, the ECPA prohibits the interception and disclosure of wire or oral com-
munications without a court order. Id. § 2518.
46. Id. § 2510.
47. Id. § 2510(1). The statute also defines "electronic communications" as "any trans-
fer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted
in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical sys-
tem." Id. § 2512(12).
48. 488 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Burnside, supra note 42, at 468.
However, Kansas and Rhode Island do not agree with this interpretation. See Kas-
tenmeier et al., supra note 6, at 724. The ECPA amendment eliminated the common car-
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entire communication must be transmitted via wire.4 9 Oral communi-
cations exclude all electronically transmitted communications.50 The
ECPA only protects oral communications uttered with a justifiable ex-
pectation of privacy. 1 If any portion of a communication were oral,
then the entire communication would be characterized as oral. 2
As the ECPA has been interpreted by the courts, cordless tele-
phone users have no expectation of privacy.53 The ECPA explicitly
left cordless conversations unprotected "because communications
made on some cordless telephones can be intercepted easily with
readily available technologies such as an AM radio, [and therefore] it
would be inappropriate to make the interception of such communica-
tion a criminal offense. ' 54 The ECPA left unresolved questions such
as whether regular (landline) telephone calls to cordless telephones
are also not protected. This is of particular concern in certain circum-
stances, such as when a caller is unaware that the other party is on a
cordless telephone.55
However, cellular telephone users are protected because cellular
telephones are interpreted as "wired" communications.5 6 Thus, a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy entitles cellular communications to full
protection against warrantless, nonconsensual interceptions. 7 The
ECPA covers communications between two cellular telephones and
between a landline telephone and a cellular telephone. 8 This result
seems odd. As technology advances, users must await a court decision
rier requirement for wire communications that existed under Title III. Wintersheimer,
supra note 21, at 324.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. See also Burnside, supra note 42, at 473. The court in Edwards
v. Bardwell held that the use of a "bearcat scanner" to intercept a communication between
a regular landline phone and a car radio telephone was not a violation of Title III, because
a radio telephone was not wired. 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La. 1986), affd 808 F.2d 54
(5th Cir. 1986).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
51. Id. Cordless telephone conversations are not considered "wire communications"
but are oral communications, and cordless phone users have no justifiable expectation of
privacy due to the warnings in the owner's manual and on the label on the base of the
phone unit. State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 692-94 (R.I. 1985). See also Battaglia, supra
note 26, at 1091; Caming, supra note 27, at 31.
52. Delaurier, 488 A.2d at 694.
53. See id. at 692-94. See also Caming, supra note 27, at 31; Robinson, supra note 14,
at 107.
54. Robinson, supra note 14, at 107. See also Caming, supra note 27, at 31. (For criti-
cism of the courts' interpretation of this statute see generally Robinson, supra note 14.)
55. Robinson, supra note 14, at 107. See also Burnside, supra note 42, at 504-05.
56. Rabel, supra note 16, at 672.
57. Caming, supra note 27, at 29.
58. Wintersheimer, supra note 21, at 333. For background on cellular phones, see
Rabel, supra note 16, at 665-66.
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on whether a particular device is technically "wired" and whether
users can reasonably expect privacy. Until then, many wireless users
will have to guess whether they have the right to expect privacy.
Radio waves are neither wire nor oral communications, so courts
have analyzed them under the expectation of privacy test.59 The
courts usually deny Title III protection to communications over radio
waves; they find that the user has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.' Also, the ECPA amendment to Title III does not cover the
radio portion of cordless telephone communications.
61
Pagers which transmit only tonal sounds are not covered under
the ECPA.62 Voice and digital display pagers are protected under the
ECPA63 because they are a continuation of a wire communication and
are covered under the Wiretap Act.' Voice communication is consid-
ered an aural communication-"a transfer of the human voice be-
tween and including the point of origin and point of reception, ' 65 and
is protected under Title III. The digital display pager is an electronic
communication and is protected under "other acquisition" of a wire
communication.66
Section 2512 of Title III outlaws the sale or manufacture of de-
vices designed to intercept wire and oral communications.67 In 1986
this restriction was expanded by the ECPA to include devices
designed to intercept electronic communications. 6  However, the
ECPA specifically provides for the lawful use of pen registers (devices
that can record the numbers dialed to or from a telephone). 69 The
United States Supreme Court has ruled that the use of a pen register
59. Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1987); Edwards v.
Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La. 1986), affd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986).
60. Meyer, supra note 13, at 431.
61. Wintersheimer, supra note 21, at 334.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). See also Wintersheimer, supra note 21, at 335. These
pagers were never covered under Title III because there was no aural transfer of informa-
tion. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). See also Wintersheimer, supra note 21, at 335.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 18,24 (1986). See also Kastenmeier et
al., supra note 6, at 730.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(18). See also Wintersheimer, supra note 21, at 335.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The only federal case involving a pager pre-dates the ECPA.
In Dorsey v. State the defendant telephoned messages to a paging company which trans-
mitted the messages to a pocket pager via radio waves. The communication involved a
drug deal. The police used a radio scanner to intercept the radio wave portion of the
communication. The court ruled that Title III protection did not apply as there was no
"wire" communication. 402 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1981). See also Burnside, supra note 42, at
470.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b).
68. Id.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(h)(i).
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is permissible without a court order under Title III because 1) pen
registers cannot obtain contents of telephone conversations, 70 and 2)
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone num-
bers an individual dials.71 Furthermore, no judicial approval is:neces-
sary for government access to information generated by a pen
register.72
The current laws attempting to deal with wireless communication
and privacy are unclear, unpredictable as to how future technology
would be interpreted under current law, and unable to keep up with
technological advances.
B. Warnings
Presently, there are warnings in owner's manuals and on labels on
the base of cordless telephones stating that the user should have no
expectation of privacy. Specifically, the label states, "Privacy of com-
munications may not be ensured when using this telephone. '73 How-
ever, hardly anyone reads the manual or the label. Members of the
general public go about their daily lives under the misconception that
their cordless telephone conversations are private. Part of the prob-
lem is that the label is on the base, not the handset.74 Also, the impli-
cations of the warning are not clear to most people.
C. Scrambling Devices
Private industry has attempted to solve the privacy problem with
coding devices that scramble wireless communications, similar to de-
vices that scramble cable television signals. Cryptographic programs
scramble readable data into a binary code of Os and ls that must be
decrypted to be used again.75 Software within the computerized de-
vice encrypts the conversation or data transmission before it is trans-
mitted.76 The combination of numbers which comprise the code is
determined each time the user makes a telephone call.77 The receiver
will need a second encryption device to decode the communication.78
70. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
71. Id. at 742. See also Wintersheimer, supra note 21, at 327 n.90.
72. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746.
73. Caming, supra note 27, at 31.
74. Robinson, supra note 14, at 110-11.
75. John Mintz, U.S. Moves to Ensure Its Ability to Eavesdrop; White House Selects
Device for Scrambling Telephone, Fax, Computer Communications, WASH. POST, Apr. 17,
1993, at A9.




This offers users privacy because with the code, the communications
are just a bunch of garbled noise to an eavesdropper and would take
hundreds of years to decode. The device plugs into the handset of any
standard telephone, costs between $1,200 and $3,000, and is the size of
an answering machine.79 "Although computer encoding is now used
in only a small amount of electronic communications, computer ex-
perts expect volume to grow rapidly as more of the nation's commerce
begins to flow over data networks-especially wireless networks that
are particularly subject to eavesdropping unless the information is
coded."8 Thousands of devices have been sold to major banks, oil
companies, and law firms primarily for overseas calls.8'
There is a downside to encryption. Law enforcement has com-
plained that the technology has made it more difficult to catch drug
dealers and other criminals.82 These systems are expensive. 83 They
have also become so sophisticated that they have rendered traditional
wiretap technology obsolete.' Thus, even court authorized Wiretaps
cannot be carried out because of the technology. Wiretaps do not
work on DES85 because DES algorithms are published and have been
modified by computer hackers to defeat wiretaps.86
I
The Clinton Administration's Proposals
to Solve the Problem
The Clinton Administration has proposed two solutions toward
resolving the conflict between the need for privacy and the need for
effective law enforcement. The primary proposal is the inexpensive
"Clipper Chip," a scrambler which the administration would like to
make the industry standard in all communication devices. By using
the Clipper Chip for government communications, those companies
79. Id.
80. Way to Ensure Electronic Privacy; Administration Plans New Garbling System to
Thwart Illegal Snoopers, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 16, 1993, at A22.
81. Eckhouse, supra note 19.
82. Sandy Shore, Controversy for Computer Privacy Code, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 8, 1994, at
B6.
83. Eckhouse, supra note 19.
84. Shore, supra note 82.
85. Data Encryption System (DES) is the de facto standard encryption system. It was
developed twenty years ago by IBM, Inc. Robert L. Hotz, Computer Code's Security Wor-
ries Privacy Watchdogs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at Al.
86. Administration's Encryption Initiative Not Welcomed by Industry, Experts Say,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 156, at D-23 (Aug. 16, 1993) [hereinafter Adminis-
tration's Encryption]. See also Jack Robertson, Panel Urges Clipper Delay as Crypto Plan
Draws Fire, ELECTRONIC NEWS 1993, June 7, 1993, at 1.
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who want to communicate with the government must also use the
Clipper Chip. This affordable scrambler allows the government to re-
tain the "key" to decode the communications. In other words, law
enforcement will still be able to "tap" into communications with a
court order. The second proposed solution is the possibility of legisla-
tion that forces telephone companies to modify their equipment to
keep other advances in technology from hampering law enforcement's
ability to perform wiretaps.
A. Clipper Chip
1. Background
On April 16, 1993 the Clinton Administration announced the de-
velopment of a new coding device, the Clipper Chip, and proposed
initiatives to implement the Chip.87 The Clipper Chip is a tiny circuit
barely bigger than a beetle.' When the Chip is attached to a data
transmitter, such as a telephone or fax machine, it uses a long string of
numbers (an algorithm) to scramble the data so that it cannot be in-
tercepted and decoded by a third party.89 The Clipper Chip "enables
a user to encrypt electronic documents before sending them to the
intended recipient, but the recipient must have received the sender's
secret key beforehand in order to decrypt the document."'
The Clipper Chip code is harder to crack than existing encoding
systems.91 It has an eighty digit binary code, called the Skipjack, in-
stead of a fifty-six bit code used by DES.92 The government has kept
the algorithm classified, contending that because DES algorithms are
published, they have become vulnerable to modifications that defeat
wiretaps.93 However, many industry experts argue that publishing the
algorithm would not compromise its effectiveness.94 Furthermore,
since the algorithm is not public, there is no way to know if it is indeed
87. Christopher Drew, Privacy Device Leaves Cops a Key, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 1993, at
N1. See also Administration's Encryption, supra note 86; John Burgess, Encryption Deci-
sion is Questioned, WASH. POST, May 7, 1993, at F3; John Schwartz, U.S. Data Decoding
Plan Delayed Business and Legal Objections Reviewed, WASH. POST, June 8, 1993, at A12.
88. Hotz, supra note 85.
89. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
90. Ellen Messmer, NSA Has Public-Key Chip to Complement Clipper Chip; Uses
Same Controversial Key Escrow System, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 26, 1993, at 5. See also
Gillmor, supra note 35.
91. Drew, supra note 87.
92. Frank J. Murray, Government Picks Affordable Chip to Scramble Phone Calls,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at C5.
93. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86. See also Robertson, supra note 86.
94. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86; Ellen Messmer, Clipper Chip Targeted
at Low-Speed Apps, NIST Says, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 9, 1993, at 16; Messmer, supra
note 90.
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sixteen million times 95 as complex as that used by chips now on the
market.96
The most controversial aspect of the Clipper Chip is its "key" that
would allow "key-holders" the ability to decode a Clipper Chip scram-
bled communication. Each chip has a unique serial number and
"key. '97 The "key" is actually a long string of binary numbers (Os and
ls)98 to be split in two.9 When the manufacturer makes the devices, it
will send the two keys for each unit to a database established by the
Attorney General.'" For each device the Attorney General will give
one key to one official and the other key to another official. To un-
scramble a Clipper Chip coded communication, one must match the
two coding keys held by different officials. Only under court-author-
ized operations could the officials bring the keys together.10 1 In order
for a law enforcement agency to intercept and decipher a private
message encoded by the chip, it would have to obtain a warrant to tap
a suspect's telephone, identify the chip's serial number from the
broadcast, 10 2 record the encrypted message, and get two separate de-
coding keys to decrypt the recording. 03 The Attorney General would
decide who would hold the keys."° Proposals of who would hold the
keys included two government agencies, °5 such as the Commerce De-
partment's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
and a non-law enforcement section of the Treasury Department.0 6
When legal authorization for the wiretap expires, the keys are
destroyed.
10 7
95. Murray, supra note 92.
96. Hotz, supra note 85 (arguing that the Clipper Chip is only twice as complex).
97. Kahn, supra note 15.
98. Id.
99. John Mintz & John Schwartz, Chipping Away at Privacy? Encryption Device
Widens Debate Over Rights of U.S. to Eavesdrop, WASH. POST, May 30, 1993, at Hi.
100. Sophisticated Phone Scrambler Released by US for Private Use, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 17, 1993, at 6 [hereinafter Sophisticated Phone Scrambler].
101. Drew, supra note 87. Seealso Mintz, supra note 75.
102. See generally Robert L. Hotz, Demanding the Ability to Snoop; Afraid New Tech-
nology May Foil Eavesdropping Efforts, U.S. Officials Want Phone and Computer Users to
Adopt the Same Privacy Code. The Government Would Hold the Only Key, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1993, at Al.
103. Jube Shiver Jr., Tapping Into High-Tech Talk Device OKd to Help Feds Monitor
Computer-Encoded Calls, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at Dl. See also Mintz & Schwartz,
supra note 99.
104. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
105. Industry Criticizes "Clipper Chip"; Calls for Review of Other Systems, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA) No. 106, at D-27 (June 4, 1993) [hereinafter Industry Criticizes].
106. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
107. Hotz, supra note 102.
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The Clipper Chip was invented by engineers at the National Se-
curity Agency (NSA), 1°8 "the super-secret eavesdropping and code-
breaking agency,"' 9 in conjunction with NIST." ° NIST also devel-
oped another government sponsored encryption chip, named Cap-
stone,"1 to encrypt computer data.
112
The government licensed two California companies, Mykotronx
and VLSI Technology, to manufacture and market"1 3 the Clipper
Chips." 4  The license was not put out for competitive bidding." 5
NIST states that the government is working to get additional
suppliers.
16
Government officials want the Clipper Chip to replace America's
current encryption standard, DES. DES was developed about twenty
years ago and is generally considered to be breakable." 7 The govern-
ment does not want to make the Clipper Chip the mandatory stan-
dard" 8 but hopes to make it the de facto standard by two methods.
The first method is to make the Clipper Chip so affordable and wide-
spread that it would pervade telecommunications and make alterna-
tives so expensive that few criminals could afford them. 19 The second
method is to have government agencies, such as the Justice Depart-
ment, military, and intelligence agencies, purchase and use the Clipper
Chip in all its security telephones. 20 The Clinton Administration
hopes that use by government agencies will make the Clipper Chip the
de facto standard encryption device, just as the adoption of VHS over
Beta videotape machines caused VHS to become the standard. 2'
108. Drew, supra note 87. See also Don Clark, High-Tech Group Protests US Proposal
on Privacy, S.F. CHRON., May 28, 1993, at D1; Gillmor, supra note 35; Mintz, supra note
75; John Schwartz, U.S. Data Decoding Plan Delayed Business and Legal Objections Re-
viewed, WASH. POST, June 8, 1993, at A12.
109. Mintz, supra note 75; Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99. The NSA is also known as
the intelligence agency responsible for spy satellites and communications intercepts. So-
phisticated Phone Scrambler, supra note 100.
110. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86; Murray, supra note 92; Schwartz,
supra note 108; Sophisticated Phone Scrambler, supra note 100.
111. Gillmor, supra note 35.
112. Kahn, supra note 15.
113. Mintz, supra note 75.
114. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86; Drew, supra note 87; Shiver, supra
note 103; Sophisticated Phone Scrambler, supra note 100.
115. Hotz, supra note 85.
116. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
117. Mintz, supra note 75.
118. Robertson, supra note 86.
119. Shiver, supra note 103.
120. Drew, supra note 87.
121. Murray, supra note 92.
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Since only compatible telephones can receive secure communica-
tions from a telephone using a Clipper Chip, 22 many companies that
do business with the government will need to buy telephones and
computers with the Clipper Chip installed. 2 3 NIST wants to make the
Clipper Chip the Federal Information Processing Standard.124 Mak-
ing the Clipper Chip the federal purchasing standard125 makes it eas-
ier for federal. government agencies to buy the Chip.126 If the Clipper
Chip becomes the standard it would be an attractive alternative to the
current federal standard, DES.'27
The Administration has already ordered nine thousand tele-
phones equipped with the Clipper Chip from AT&T (a contract worth
$8.17 million).128 AT&T will insert the Clipper Chip into "small, box-
like devices that attach to any desk or mobile phone to prevent eaves-
dropping."1 29 The device would be the size of a small notebook and
cost $1200.131
2. Purpose
The Clipper Chip was developed "to strike a balance between the
need for privacy and the government's ability to intercept communica-
tions."'' It was designed to "[h]elp companies protect proprietary
information"'132 by preventing criminals, "terrorist[s] and industrial
spies from decoding communications [made] over telephones, fax ma-
chines and computers while ensuring the government's ability to
eavesdrop.'133 It would also prevent drug dealers and other criminals
from making their communications immune from court ordered wire-
taps.' The Administration sees the Clipper Chip as a means of
"bring[ing] the Federal Government together with industry in a volun-
tary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone com-
122. Id.
123. Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99.
124. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
125. Ellen Messmer, Clipper Chip Foes Denounce Scheme Over Cost Issues; Vendors
and Users Rail Against Encryption Plan, NETWORK WORLD, June 7, 1993, at 2.
126. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Sophisticated Phone Scrambler, supra note 100.
130. Mintz, supra note 75. There is controversy that AT&T received this sole-source
contract without competitive bidding. Messmer, supra note 125. For any other company to
make the chip, it would have to assume a market outside the government. Administra-
tion's Encryption, supra note 86.
131. Shiver, supra note 103.
132. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
133. Mintz, supra note 75.
134. Drew, supra note 87.
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munications while meeting the legitimate needs of law
enforcement."'
1 35
Currently, the computer industry has systems that scramble data
transfers and telephone conversations, but criminals are starting to
use these systems to foil court-authorized wiretaps. 136 There are those
in private industry who view the Clipper Chip as an attempt to head
off independent private efforts to develop computerized encryption. 37
The government wants to discourage the use of highly capable, non-
clipper encryption programs that are becoming increasingly popular,
such as the RSA Data Security Inc. (RSA),'138 because the NSA can-
not decode these systems.139 Since approximately one million com-
puters and software programs sold in this country employ RSA
gear,"4 RSA believes the government is going to use its standards
implementation and purchasing power to fight RSA.' 4'
3. Advantages
The Clinton Administration touts the Clipper Chip as being bet-
ter and more sophisticated than any other encryption device. 4 2 This
cannot be confirmed, since the government will not reveal details for
the private industry to examine. 43 The government has allowed a
team of five cryptography experts to review the algorithm.'" The
team of experts gave an interim report on July 29, 1993 which stated
that there is "no significant risk" of the code being broken. 45
The Clipper Chip is supposedly so much more sophisticated than
DES that it would take a powerful computer thirty-six years to crack
Skipjack, the classified mathematical formula, compared to ten years
to crack DES.'" While cracking the DES code would take a Cray
Supercomputer two hundred years to run through all of the possible
135. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
136. Drew, supra note 87.
137. Mintz, supra note 75.
138. Id.
139. Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99.
140. Mintz, supra note 75.
141. Id.
142. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86; Drew, supra note 87.
143. Hotz, supra note 85; Industry Criticizes, supra note 105; Robertson, supra note 86;
Winn Schwartau, Crypto Policy and Business Privacy; The Clinton Administration's Pro-
posed Clipper Chip Workplace Privacy, PC WEEK, June 28, 1993, at 207.
144. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
145. Id. Note that the DES formula was made public so that independent computer
experts and corporate cryptographers could test it to make sure it was secure. Hotz, supra
note 85.
146. Messmer, supra note 94.
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algorithm variations, 47 the Clipper Chip is sixteen million times more
difficult than DES for an outsider to penetrate. 1'
Furthermore, the Clipper Chip allows law enforcement to do its
job. However adequate DES may be in protecting the privacy of com-
munications, law enforcement does not have access to the DES code
keys. 49 Years ago, when AT&T controlled telephones and IBM con-
trolled computers, the NSA had the two companies' cooperation in
law enforcement. 5 Now with many little Baby Bells (BOCs) and
even more computer companies, the NSA does not enjoy the coopera-
tion from private industry it once had.'5 '
Perhaps the best feature of the Clipper Chip is that it is a rela-
tively inexpensive scrambling device. The cost of the Chip can be as
little as thirty dollars per chip in the near future. 52 In lots of ten
thousand or more 53 costs could eventually become as low as ten dol-
lars per chip.' 54 With such a low price, the Clipper Chip will be widely
available to the general public, 155 unlike DES.
4. Opposition and Limitations
Despite these advantageous features, many oppose the adoption
of the Clipper Chip. Thirty major electronic companies and trade as-
sociations sent an open letter to President Clinton stating that they
"believe that there are fundamental privacy and other constitutional
rights that must be taken into account.' 1 56 Among those opposing the
adoption of the Clipper Chip are Apple Computer, AT&T, Digital
Equipment Corporation, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Lotus Development
Corporation, MCI Communications Corporation, Microsoft Corpora-
tion, RSA Data Security Inc., Sun Microsystems Inc., and the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union.' 57 Many in the electronic industry are
upset that they were not consulted and, more importantly, that their
research and development investments on similar scrambling devices
may be wiped out by adoption of the Clipper Chip.'
5 8
147. Robertson, supra note 86.
148. Id. It would take a billion years to break the Clipper Chip code. Mintz, supra note
75.
149. Robertson, supra note 86.
150. Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99.
151. Id.
152. Murray, supra note 92.
153. Shiver, supra note 103; Sophisticated Phone Scrambler, supra note 100.
154. Murray, supra note 92.
155. Id.
156. Burgess, supra note 82.
157. Schwartau, supra note 143.
158. Drew, supra note 87; Murray, supra note 92.
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Moreover, the industry is unwilling to trust the government with
the keys to unlock encrypted information from the private sector.'
59
They are concerned that "Big Brother" may be listening when he
should not be."6 However, it seems that adoption of the Clipper Chip
may not increase potential Big Brother abuses. The government does
not need a search warrant outside the United States, so it may use the
Clipper Chip to monitor conversations where one or more of the users
is outside the United States.161 Currently, the private sector can pro-
tect its confidential communications with DES, which the government
cannot decrypt.' 62
Some critics suspect that a code developed by the NSA could
have a "'trapdoor'-an intentional flaw to make it easy for the gov-
ernment to gain access to encoded communications.' 63 The govern-
ment can counter such critics by pointing out that the Clipper Chip
has a two key-keeper safeguard instead of one to guard against poten-
tial abuses. However, the critics do not trust those who hold the keys.
Industry and civil libertarians advocate the use of one or more private
organizations or companies to hold the keys, thereby ensuring that
law enforcement does not overstep its bounds. 64 However, the key
holder must have legal authority to participate in government surveil-
lance and be constantly available. 65
As long as other encryption systems are available, the Clipper
Chip will be ineffective in aiding law enforcement. Criminals will
merely use other encryption devices. 66 Since many criminals do not
do business with the government, adoption of the Chip by government
agencies would not force criminals to also adopt use of the Chip. 67
With other encryption techniques and the present federal DES avail-
able, why would anyone use the Clipper Chip when it is vulnerable to
being unlocked? 168 Critics argue that the use of the Clipper Chip
makes no sense unless such use is mandatory. 69 Even then, criminals
and anyone else could get other encryption devices from overseas.
159. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
160. Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99.
161. Clark, supra note 108.




166. Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99; Shiver, supra note 103; Kahn, supra note 15.
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168. Id.
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Many criminals already do so.'70 Unless it becomes the most widely
used commercial encryption system and drives all other private com-
petitors out of the business,' 7 ' only law abiding citizens will use the
Clipper Chip and be vulnerable to government eavesdropping.
172
Furthermore, the Clipper Chip does not address the wider prob-
lem of how to make digital transmissions more accessible to wiretap-
ping.173 On a digital system, a conversation is broken down into a
series of electronic Os and is.174 Thousands of digital conversations
are transmitted over a single link.17 5 Currently, wiretapping technol-
ogy cannot isolate a single conversation for recording as required
under the 1968 federal law.176 The newest digital technology, to be
completed by 1997, will effectively lock law enforcement agents out of
many telephone calls on the West Coast. 77 Even if the Clipper Chip
allowed law enforcement to tap any conversation it wished, is it worth
the high cost to switch to the Clipper Chip from DES? Though the
cost per chip is low, the cost to switch is great because a user must buy
entirely different devices in order to use the Clipper Chip. The gov-
ernment is currently planning to purchase more than eight billion dol-
lars worth of equipment for the Clipper Chip. 71 Private industry,
such as banks who communicate electronically with the federal gov-
ernment, will have to use the Clipper Chip once the government
adopts it.' 79 It will be even more costly for multinational corporations
because the Clipper Chip does not abide by international encryption
standards. 80
Another limitation of the Clipper Chip is that it cannot be ex-
ported. Some countries require "full disclosure of the algorithm"
before importation.' 8 1 In addition, multinational and foreign-based
companies might not like the fact that United States authorities can
170. Drew, supra note 87.
171. Id.
172. Robertson, supra note 167.
173. Shiver, supra note 103.
174. Hotz, supra note 16.
175. Shiver, supra note 103.
176. Id.
177. Hotz, supra note 16.
178. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
179. Messmer, supra note 125. When Citibank switched to the Clipper Chip on its
global net, it also needed newly trained personnel and additional hardware. Id.
180. Id.
181. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
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unscramble its communications. 182 No one would want a scrambling
device that the United States government can decode.8 3
This point may be moot since the government currently prevents
the export of many powerful American-made encryption techniques.
Clipper-embedded products would be largely barred for export under
the State Department Arms Control List covering crypto products.
184
This law also covers DES. This is an unnecessary law because many
other countries including Japan and Britain can export this technol-
ogy.185 The purpose of the State Department Arms Control List is to
deny advanced technology with military uses to potential adversa-
ries."' But what it denies is markets for producers by denying mul-
tinational firms the ability to use encryption devices in their own
operations.18 7 The United States software industry has been forced to
develop two systems, one with DES for the domestic market and an-
other without the encryption system for export.188 The two systems
are not interoperable.8 9 The Clipper Chip is not compatible with the
hardware and software which can be used internationally. 190
Since the Chip cannot be exported, the Chip will hinder United
States industries because it puts United States companies at odds with
the rest of the world.' 9 ' Currently, DES is widely used throughout the
world.'92 Lotus says it has lost many foreign sales because customers
demand strong software security like DES. 93 The DES demand will
be met by other countries if not by the United States. 94 This jeopar-
dizes forty to fifty percent of Hewlett-Packard's, Digital Equipment
Corporation's, IBM's, SUN's, and even AT&T's business.'95
Furthermore, the Clipper Chip may be inadequate for high-speed
telecommunications equipment. 96 The Chip is unusable for computer
182. Drew, supra note 87.
183. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86; Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99; John
Mintz & John Schwartz, Encryption Program Draws Fresh Attacks, WASH. POST, Sept. 18,
1993, at C1.
184. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86; Robertson, supra note 86.
185. Industry Criticizes, supra note 105.
186. Fred W. Weingarten, Communications Technology: New Challenges to Privacy, 21
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 735, 752 (1988).
187. Id.
188. Industry Criticizes, supra note 105.
189. Id.
190. Administration's Encryption, supra note 86.
191. Robertson, supra note 86.
192. Id.
193. Industry Criticizes, supra note 105.
194. Robertson, supra note 86.
195. Robertson, supra note 167.
196. Messmer, supra note 94.
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communications over packer-switched nets."9 One of the industry's
major complaints in regard to the Clipper Chip is that it lacks software
application because of the classified algorithm. 198 NIST is unable to
develop a version in software which does not compromise the al-
gorithm. 99 Novell and others in the international industry coalition
developed a network security model that can be implemented in both
hardware and software. 2" Novell's model uses DES and RSA.20 '
The Clipper Chip's hardware may make it more costly and less
convenient.2 °2
5. Current Status
The Clipper Chip proposal is under review by the congressionally
chartered Federal Advisory Committee on Computer Privacy and Se-
curity and Commerce Department.20 3 The thirteen member commit-
tee voted to delay a September 1, 1993 decision on adopting the
Clipper Chip for the following reasons: 1) they needed time to con-
sider various issues, including whether adoption would a) damage
America's computer and communications trade, b) run-up costs of
United States businesses, and c) violate American constitutional
rights; 2) the Chip's algorithm might be compromised;204 and 3)
whether there were any side deals with AT&T making AT&T the sole
supplier of the equipment to the Department of Justice.20 5
On June 4, 1993 another Commerce Department advisory com-
mittee, the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board,
decided that too little was known about the Chip to implement it as
widely as the administration desires.2° The Committee had not ade-
quately investigated the Chip's economic implications and was not
convinced the Chip would solve the problems for which it was
designed.2"7 Subsequently, NIST announced it would slow wide-
spread adoption of the Clipper Chip.2°8
197. Messmer, supra note 125.
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B. Regulate Technology So Non-Decodable Sophisticated Systems Can
No Longer Be Used
The Clinton Administration is considering banning more sophisti-
cated systems that law enforcement cannot crack.'0 9 But as Represen-
tative Markey (D-Mass.) pointed out, "banning encryption may be
like banning privacy."21° In addition, the ban will hinder United
States companies' exports as well as put at risk research and develop-
ment dollars already expended on sophisticated encryption systems.
Moreover, the FBI is separately seeking legislation to force, tele-
phone companies to modify their equipment to keep technological ad-
vances from hampering its ability to perform wiretaps.21' In March,
1992 the FBI introduced a "legislative proposal that would require
telecommunication firms to guarantee law enforcement access to its
new information networks. '21 2 AT&T and other telephone compa-
nies opposed this proposal,213 which was later withdrawn.21 4
France currently legislates technology so that sophisticated sys-
tems can no longer be used. France does not allow anyone to bring in
encrypting devices because they interfere with monitoring. 215 Official
wiretapping is widespread in France.216 In France "wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping are illegal if used to uncover information
about a person's sexual life or personal finances, but are permissible,
at least under Article 368, if done for purposes of spying on a person's
business or political activity. '21
7
IV
What Are Our Options
In summary, there are a wide range of options to protect the pri-
vacy of wireless communication users or to give law enforcement the
ability to conduct wiretaps, but none of the options seem to strike a
harmonious balance between the two.
209. Messmer, supra note 125; Mintz & Schwartz, supra note 99; Murray, supra note 92.
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216. Edward A. Tomlinson, The Saga of Wiretapping in France: What It Tells Us About
the French Criminal Justice System, 53 LA. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1993).
217. Id. at 1113 n.90.
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A. Leave Technology Alone
A popular suggestion is to leave technology alone, allowing in-
dustry and the marketplace to develop systems to ensure privacy in
wireless communication devices. However, this is merely maintaining
the status quo, and it has already been shown that there is no potential
solution to solve the problem of allowing limited law enforcement ac-
cess to carry out authorized wiretaps while giving the public more pri-
vacy against unauthorized intrusions.
B. Give the Public Better Warning
The public should receive better warning of the vulnerability of
their communications. For instance, cordless telephones should have
a large warning label on the handset of the telephone, so that the con-
sumer will actually see the warning. Another approach is to make
explicit what it means not to be able to expect privacy when using the
device, including the range of legal consequences. Once the public is
aware of how vulnerable their communications are, consumer demand
for devices that maintain privacy will increase and would give manu-
facturers incentive to devise appropriate solutions to the problem.
C. Change the Frequency for Cordless Telephohes
Currently, cordless telephones share the same band of frequen-
cies as that used by standard AM/FM radio receivers.218 The FCC
could change the assignment of frequencies to cordless telephones if
there were capacity on the spectrum.219 However, this assumes that
cordless telephones could operate on other, higher frequencies. There
is also the question of whether existing cordless telephones could take
advantage of this change or whether they would be rendered useless
once the change is made.
A change in frequency would protect cordless telephone conver-
sations from being intercepted by radio listeners. However, cordless
telephone conversations being intercepted by AM/FM radios is not
the greatest privacy problem. Since most valuable data and sensitive
communications pass over wireless communication devices other than
cordless telephones everyday in this country, this situation would be
unaffected by changing the frequency for cordless telephones. These
communications would not be rendered any more secure or accessible
to law enforcement by this proposal. Besides, the courts have already
said that cordless telephone users have no expectation of privacy.
218. Caming, supra note 27, at 32.
219. Rabel, supra note 16, at 678.
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Presumably all cordless telephone users are aware of this and accept
the risks by continuing to use their telephones. Therefore, there is no
need to go to such great lengths to ensure cordless telephone users'
privacy.
D. Revamp Current Legislation: ECPA
The ECPA does not solve the problem due to the inconsistencies
in applying the ECPA to different technology; in other words, cordless
telephone users do not have any expectation of privacy whereas cellu-
lar telephone users do. Also, the ECPA does not keep pace with tech-
nology. For instance, the ECPA regards cordless telephones with
encrypted systems as still having no expectation of privacy. There-
fore, the implementation of the Clipper Chip also would not affect the
status of communication devices under the ECPA. If the communica-
tion device did not have legal protection before the Clipper Chip, it
will not have it with the Clipper Chip.
At the very least, the ECPA should be revamped so that commu-
nication devices with the Clipper Chip have an expectation of privacy
that will be legally protected.
E. Regulate Technology
Banning more sophisticated systems that law enforcement cannot
tap is not a good solution to the problem because it stifles ingenuity
and hands over the business of encryption devices to foreign compa-
nies. In fact, some companies may leave the United States in order to
be allowed to conduct their business of developing sophisticated en-
cryption systems for the world market. Furthermore, those inclined to
break the law may bring a sophisticated encryption device into the
country from abroad illegally, and the government and law enforce-
ment would still not have the ability to perform wiretaps. This leaves
only small-time criminals and law abiding citizens vulnerable to gov-
ernment intrusion.
If the United States forces the disclosure of algorithms much like
France and other nations, it will lead to the same uproar regarding Big
Brother as we presently have under the proposed Clipper Chip. How-
ever, it would allow law enforcement access to codes other than the
Clipper Chip. Still, it does not address the fact that modifications can
be made to known algorithms to render them immune to wiretaps.
The proposal also depends on companies and others to abide by the
law and report their algorithms. Those involved in espionage and
other sophisticated crimes would merely smuggle algorithms not pres-
ently known in the United States into the country.
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F. Clipper Chip
The Clinton Administration's Clipper Chip will not solve the
problem because it depends on becoming the de facto standard en-
cryption device, which will not occur as long as people fear Big
Brother may be listening. The Chip will not meet law enforcement's
needs because it will only give law enforcement access to those who
use the Clipper Chip in their communications. As we have already
discussed, criminals are unlikely to use the Clipper Chip knowing that
law enforcement could unscramble their communications. Criminals,
as well as anyone concerned with privacy, would be more likely to use
a modification of DES or a software encryption system not accessible
to the government.
Aside from this, the Clipper Chip has application limitations be-
cause initially, it can only be used on low-speed, circuit-switched, tele-
communications networks. 220 Thus, sophisticated communications
networks would require different higher-speed algorithms to encode
communications. The use of their multiple algorithms may create an
interoperability issue.221
G. Clipper Chip and No One Has the Key
What about using the Clipper Chip but not allowing anyone to
hold the key? If the Chip is inexpensive and widely available, then
the Chip would virtually solve the problem of privacy in communica-
tions-assuming of course that the public does not believe that the
NSA programmed in a "trap-door." The Clipper Chip would differ
from DES in that the lower price would make it widely available and
no one would know the algorithm. However, without a key, any ef-
forts by law enforcement to tap communications would be locked-out.
H. Hold Manufacturers Strictly Liable
Another suggestion to ensure user privacy is to put the responsi-
bility on the manufacturers of the wireless communication devices by
making the manufacturers liable to their users for any breaches of pri-
vacy.222 This has the advantage of giving manufacturers an incentive
to devise their own inexpensive scrambling device. At present, the
only incentive manufacturers have to develop scrambling devices is a
slight competitive edge in the marketplace. Since most consumers are
not aware of how vulnerable their wireless communications are to be-
220. Messmer, supra note 94.
221. Id.
222. Robinson, supra note 14, at 111.
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ing intercepted, the widespread demand to justify the cost of develop-
ing an encryption system is lacking. However, the possibility of being
held strictly liable may give manufacturers the added incentive to de-
velop a low-cost encryption device that can be used on most commu-
nication devices. Now, will this device be one that law enforcement
can decode? Probably not. Without legislation there is no incentive
for a manufacturer to make a system susceptible to government eaves-
dropping. Thus, making manufacturers strictly liable-would not solve
the problem of balancing the needs of law enforcement with the needs
of privacy, unless government reaches an agreement with manufactur-
ers-perhaps permitting exportation of a newly developed encryption
system if the government is the only one allowed to hold the key.
V
Conclusion
There is no proposal in sight that will completely solve the prob-
lem of giving law enforcement limited access to carry out authorized
wiretaps while giving the public more privacy against unauthorized in-
trusions. As the use of wireless communications increases, the prob-
lem will only grow. America's traditions of freedom of speech and
freedom from government intrusion make the prospect of any encryp-
tion device to which the government holds the key unlikely to be ac-
cepted by the American people. Similarly, Yankee ingenuity will not
sit still for a ban on technology. Why not take advantage of the grow-
ing market and place the onerous task of a solution on the manufac-
turers of wireless communication devices? We should not only make
the manufacturers strictly liable for intrusions of privacy but also
make the manufacturers responsible for aiding the government in its
law enforcement efforts. As unpopular as this may be, a cooperative
private and public key-holding may be the only solution.
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